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Abstract
In this paper we describe a practical solution towards anonymous and verifiable databases based on the use of the recen t Improved Leigh ton- Micali protocol
for the distribution of keys. The scheme is addressed particularly to public data
held in separate government databases with the aim of preventing unauthorized
government agents from gathering and merging private data concerning individuals from these separate containers. The solution can be realized through
the recent Clipper Chip and smartcard technology, and its security relies on
the strength of these technologies. The scheme is also extendible mobile information systems.
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Introduction

Security of public data represents an issue which is increasingly becoming important
and relevant to all individuals within the society. Public data can range from statistics which bear no direct impact on any given individual in the society, to medical and
financial information ,,,"hose disclosure may affect an individual's standing within society. In traditional paper-based societies the gathering of such personal information
concerning a particular individual was difficult to perform due to the sheer amount
of manual work involved. Hence, only certain government bodies could afford such
data gathering based on some legal warrant.
1

In today's computerized world the collection and transfer of voluminous amounts of
information over wide geographic distances has been accepted as a common everyday
occurrence. With recent advances in fiber optics technology, the notion of superhighways for data is becoming a reality. With this increasing ease at which voluminous
data can be transferred and the increasing speed of data processing systems, the
capacity for data gathering and intelligent computerized processing has also been
significantly increased. These advances which are beneficial to society from one point
of view have raised questions from the opposite point of view, namely, of whether
such computing power can be misused against society both by certain individuals
within the society and by the very government upon which members of society have
placed their trust. Accepting that for the functioning of the nation some trust must
be placed by the society on its government, a method of assurance must still be used
to guarantee that an individual's personal details which are spread across different
government institutions cannot be illegally gathered and merged together giving a
total picture of that person's private life.
One of the earliest efforts directed into finding possible solutions to this problem
is that by Brandt et al in [1]. This effort recognized that databases belonging to
different institutions must provide to the individual users the properties of the users
being anonymous and the databases being verifiable. More specifically, when different
data items are given by an individual to these distinct and separate institutions,
these data items should not be identifiable by others as having come from the one
same individual. The true identity of each individual must remain unknown to other
individuals and to each institution. Each individual must also have the ability to
verify that his or her personal details held by an institution are correct. In practice,
a separate trusted authority must be appointed who can maintain the true identity
of each individual, and who can have the legal power to gather and merge details
belonging to certain individuals if such a need arises.
In this paper we investigate the issue of anonymous and verifiable databases in the
context of recent technological developments, with the aim of presenting some practical solutions to the need of such databases. Our approach is founded on the use of
smartcard technology coupled with an improved version of the recent key distribution
protocol of [2, 3].
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Motivations

The need of a practical scheme to realize the notion of anonymous and verifiable
databases is becoming self-evident in computerized nations. One recent example in
A ustralia was the public debate over the A ustralian Identity Card [4 J by which every
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Australian resident would be assigned a unique number as an identifying piece of
information. This number would then be used as a pointer to cross-reference data
in various government institutions which held information concerning the owner of
the number. Although this move by the government was defeated, in actuality the
government proceeded to use the citizens' taxation file numbers more or less as a
substitute for the proposed identity card.
One important recent development in the United States which has again brought the
debate about citizens' right to privacy into the foreground is the introduction of the
Clipper Chip [5J and its related technology. The Clipper Chip is a high-speed and
high-security encryption device to be used by the U.S. Government for its telephone
and other networking equipment. The chip has a classified encipherment algorithm
and contains a secret key. Through a "key-escrow" system an appointed government
agency can obtain a legal warrant to wiretap communications between any two parties
that are using the device. The main idea behind this notion is to provide secure
communications to the users of the Chip against external attacks, while at the same
time allowing the government to monitor communications that are suspected of being
a threat to national security or to the society in general (eg. drug traffickers, industrial
espionage) [6,7, 8J.
Here we do not argue for or against such a notion. What we propose, however, is
that such a technology should bring to society as much benefit as possible. Since
the technology is being imposed from above for one particular area of application,
it should also be used in other areas in such a way that it will protect the rights of
individuals. If indeed there is a strong ground for allowing an appointed government
agency or authority to have powers to tap into private communications, at the very
least one must ensure that this power and capability resides exclusively in the hands
of the approved agency, and not of other government institutions.
This paper extends the notions embodied in the Clipper Chip concept towards another area, namely for providing ways to achieve anonymous and verifiable databases.
vVe require the appointed agency or authority to be a trusted adjudicator between the
members of society and the other ordinary government institutions. In this way sensitive data concerning citizens in general may be guarded against illegal access while
data concerning suspected citizens can be made readily available to the appointed authority. In the following discussion we will denote the appointed government agency
as the Trusted Authority (TA). vVe assume that each institution holds a database
containing every individual's details which are relevant to the functioning of the institution. Any exchange of data between departments must be through the Trusted
Authority who regulates as to which details are exchangeable and who enforces the
chosen policies. Thus, for example, the taxation department holds taxation-related
information, while the health department has a health record of individuals that
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obtain medical service from the government hospitals. An individual is able to submit new details to each institution respectively, and each individual can query each
database independently without his or her identity being revealed.
Each individual has the duty to initially enroll himself or herself to the Trusted Authority, bringing their personal identification information (eg. birth certificate, retina
scan, fingerprint, DNA sequence). The Trusted Authority creates a pseudonym [1] for
an individual corresponding to each institution that holds data about the individual.
Hence, an individual has a different pseudonym when dealing with each institution.
For each individual, the Trusted Authority issues a tamper-proof smart card containing that individual's set of pseudonyms and other cryptographic parameters. For a
given institution, the Trusted Authority also issues cryptographic parameters which
are stored in the tamper-proof smartcard belonging to an appointed trusted local
authority (person) who is a representative of the institution (eg. system administrator). Unlike the identity of individuals, each institution has a unique identity which
is published.
The database at each institution is assumed to be managed by a trusted DBMS which
can be used by staff members at the site only through a number of tamper-free terminals [9, 10J. These tamper-free terminals represents the only valid access points to
the database. A number of tamper-free terminals are also provided at the site for use
by visiting individuals in the public, while remote tamper-free terminals may also be
connected provided that a secure channel can be created between the remote tamperfree terminals to the local tamper-free terminals. The appointed representative for
an institution has the duty to periodically load the cryptographic parameters from
his or her smartcard to each of the resident tamper-free terminals at that institution.
This configuration is shown in Figure 1.

3

Towards a practical scheme

In this section we present a practical scheme for anonymous and verifiable databases
based on the Improved Leighton-Micali (ILM) protocol [3]. The original LeightonMicali protocol of [2] had an inherent flaw which in our context allowed an attacker to
read data belonging to an individual when it is in transit between the institution and
the individual's terminal. This flaw has subsequently been solved and the protocol
improved by the work in [3J.
Following the requirements of [2, 3], we assume that tamper-proof VLSI chips are
readily available to be incorporated into smart cards and tamper-free terminals. vVe
also assume that a publicly known one-way hash function h exists (which may also
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Figure 1: Anonymous individuals and verifiable databases
be replaced with a cryptographically strong pseudo-random function).
When an individual wishes to submit data to an institution or to verify existing
data held by an institution, he or she must interact via a tamper-free terminal which
establishes a connection with another tamper-free terminal located at the institution.
Communications between these two terminals must be via a session key which is
selected by either terminal and is transferred securely to the other. The session key
is then discarded by both terminals after the session is over. Newly submitted data
is assumed to be placed in a temporary location within the institution's database to
be read, verified and classified by one of the institution's staff members. Only then
can such data be committed to the database. In the following, we assume that all
communications are protected against replays (eg. via timestamps or nonces).

3.1

Session Keys: The ILM Protocol

In the 1LM protocol it is assumed that the Trusted Authority holds kI secret keys (Xl,
... , Xi'v!). Each secret key is chosen uniformly at random by the Trusted Authority
and is of length k-bits. For each user i who is enrolled into the system, the Trusted
Authority selects AI random integers (aI, ... , aA,J) from the interval [I,L], where L
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is an integer

1.

The Trusted Authority then employs h to compute Ym = hO:m (Xm) for all m =
1, ... ,lvI, where hS(X) indicates applying consecutively the function h on an input
X for s times. That is,
S times
~

hS(X) = h(··· h(h( X))·· .).
Here (0'1, ... , aM) becomes the public key of individual i which is known to all
institutions. The corresponding secret key (Yi, ... , YM ) is then placed by the Trusted
Authority into the tamper-proof chip of the individual's smartcard. The smartcard
is only delivered to the individual after the secret key has been inserted, and hence
no person has access to the secret keys or the other secret parameters within that
individual's tamper-proof chip.
Assuming that individual i needs to verify or submit data to institution j, then their
respective terminals must establish a secure channel by way of encipherment using
key Ki,j' This secure channel will afterwards be used to transfer the random session
key Ks. The crucial requirement at this point is that both terminals must establish
the same key K;,j independently without previous communications. This process can
be done as follows [3J:
1. The terminal of individual i must obtain the public key ((31, ... , (3iV!) of institution j. This public key can be resident in within each tamper-free terminal or

it can be read by the terminal from a publicly readable file.
2. After individual i inserts his or her smart card into the terminal, the terminal
must provide the smartcard with the public key of the institution j. The tamperproof chip within the smartcard of individual i then computes the common key
I(,j as:

.< .

Z =),

i

where 8m = max(a m , 13m), m = 1, ... , lvI, and

II

> j.

(1)

denotes concatenation.

Note that the tamper-proof chip can easily compute hOm(Xm) = hlom-o:ml(Ym) (m =
1, ... , lvI) and thus Ki,j because it has available the values Ym = ho:m(Xm ) residing in
its internal memory. The tamper-proof chip of the terminal at the institution perform
symmetric procedures, and thus obtain the same key Ki,j = Kj,i [3J.
1 Leighton

about

and Micali recommended the size of M be between 10 2 and 10 5 , and the size of L be

v'iJ.
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In order to aid our subsequent discussions we will simplify Equation (1) into
r

fii,j =

{

h(Xilillj),
h(Xlljlli),

.< .

Z =),

i

> j.

(2)

As before, the k-bit value X is chosen randomly by the Trusted Authority where k
should be sufficiently large, say k ~ 100, in order to prevent it from an exhaustive
search attack [3]. The value X is kept secret by the Trusted Authority, and during
the enrollment of individuals the Trusted Authority also injects a copy of X into the
chip of the smartcard belonging to the individual and into that belonging to the local
authority at each institution. Hence, in fact, the value X is common to all parties in
the system.

3.2

Anonymity

In order to provide anonymity to individuals within the system the trusted authority
must create distinct pseudonyms for each user with respect to each of the institutions.
In order to do this each individual i must enroll in-person to the Trusted Authority and
provide it with some identification information Pi. The Trusted Authority uniformly
chooses an identity h and a secret value Si, and associates them with Pi. It is the duty
of the Trusted Authority to keep the values (Pi, h Si, SCi) secure, where SCi is the
unique chip number built into the tamper-proof chip of the individual's smartcard.
The same procedure is also observed for the local authority of each institution.
Assuming that each institution has been assigned a publicly known identity B J , the
Trusted Authority creates the pseudonym hj of the individual with identity Ii with
respect to B j as:
Here we assume that encoding scheme for the identities of individuals Ii and institutions B j are uniform. The key STA is maintained as secret by the Trusted Authority.
The secret value Si and the pseudonyms for an individual are then inserted into that
individual's chip. Similarly, each institution is given the respective pseudonym that
the individual will present to the institution.
Another secret parameter injected into the tamper-proof chips of both the individual
hj and the institution Bj is a database key Di,j, uniformly chosen by the Trusted
Authority. This database key will be used to create other keys which are further used
to control access to the database. Thus, for example, these created keys can be used
to hide passwords of individuals, to encipher the access matrix or encipher the data
in the database. In this paper we will use them to encipher stored data, although it
is clear to the reader that other modes of their usage are possible.
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3.3

Data storage

Within each institution B j data in the database concerning individual hj must be
stored in such a way that only the individual and the institution (ie. its staff) can
view the data. Assuming Ri,j represents the data of individual Ii,j at institution B j ,
a key K R ;,} must be uniformly chosen by the local authority within the institution to
be applied in order to hide data Ri,j' Bearing in mind that a secure DBMS running
above a secure operating system is crucial for overall system security, there are a
number of ways in which data can be stored in a manner that will make it accessible
to users only through the key I<R;,}' One simple method through which data can be
protected from unwanted disclosures is by way of the direct encipherment using the
above key K R ;,} (see [11]).
This encipherment key I<R;,} must also reside in an enciphered form under a key which
is available to the individual. This key-enciphering key is calculated by the staff's
terminal at the institution as:

·· =
< B·)'
I I,)
hj> B j .

(3)

In addition, for each entry in the database belonging to the individual Ii,j, a signature
or checksum [12, 13] must be created to prevent undetected changes to the data
without the individual's consent. This is achieved by using the values Si and Sj which
are in the tamper-proof chips of the individual and the institution's local authority
respecti vely.
More specifically, when the individual is requested by the institution to verify and
approve the data Ri,j about the individual to be committed into the database, the
tamper-proof chips of respective parties must generate certain parameters as input
to the signature function sig. Thus, the chip belonging to the individual Ii,j creates
ii,j = h(Ri,jIISiIIBj), while the chip belonging to the institution's local authority
creates ij,i = h(Ri,jIISjIIIi,j) (note that here ti,j =1= ij,d. The two terminals onto
which the individual and local authority are connected obtains the respective values
from the chips within the respective (inserted) smartcards, and then the terminals
exchange ii,j and ij,i over the secure channel established previously using the session
key (Figure 2).
After receiving ti,j from the individual's terminal, the institution's terminal then
computes the signature for the individual's entry. That is, the entry for individual
Ii,j within the database of institution B j is:
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Figure 2: Interaction between individual's and institution's terminals
where the symbol "{} K" denotes encipherment using key

J{.

The institution's terminal then sends this complete entry (including the signature)
and Ri,j to the individual's terminal which re-computes the signature. If both signatures are identical, the individual's terminal sends an acknowledgment to the terminal
at the institution. Both terminals then erase the values ti,j and tj,i' In this manner,
neither the individual nor the institution can modify the data illegally, since neither ii,j nor t j,i are ever directly available to the individual or the institution's staff
respecti vely.
If needed, the re-computed signature can also be sent by the individual's terminal to
a lawyer who represents the individual.

3.4

Verifiability

When an individual Ii,j wishes to view his or her data R;.j held at an institution
the individual must use his or her smartcard with a tamper-free terminal:

B j

1. The individual then selects via the tamper-free terminal the identity of the
institution Bj that holds the data the individual wishes to view.
9

2. After inserting his or her smartcard into the tamper-free terminal, the terminal
provides the smartcard, and thus the chip within, with the identity B j • The
individual's terminal must also indicate to the institution's tamper-free terminal
that a session is being requested. The institution's terminal then looks up the
identity hj of the individual.
3. The individual's chip then computes Ki,j, while the chip within the institution's
terminal computes Kj,i. As before, J(i,j = J(j,i.
4. The individual's terminal (or the institution's terminal) generates a seSSIOn
key IC. The session key IC is then exchanged by way of enciphering it with
J(i,j = J(j,i.
5. The institution's terminal then instructs the database system to return the entry
{I<R;,JKE ' {Ri,j}K R
I,)

for individual Ii,j. This entry is enciand the result is dispatched to the individual's

,sig(Ri,j,ii,j,ij,;)
I.J

phered using the session key
terminal.

lis

6. The individual's terminal deciphers the entry using the session key lis, and the
key-enciphering key J( Ei,j is recreated following Equation (3). The individual's
terminal then recovers J(R',J and uses it to decipher and present to the individual
the data R,j. The integrity of the data may also be verified by way of recreating
the signature in the manner previously discussed. This would involve the institution's terminal re-computing ij,i and sending it to the individual's terminal
via a secure channel.

4

Remarks and Conclusion

In this paper we have extended the notions embodied in the Clipper Chip concept towards achieving anonymous and verifiable databases. The Trusted Authority creates
a pseudonym for an individual corresponding to each institution that holds data about
the individual. Hence, an individual has a different pseudonym when dealing with
each institution. For each individual, the Trusted Authority issues a tamper-proof
smart card containing that individual's set of pseudonyms and other cryptographic
parameters. The database at each institution is assumed to be managed by a trusted
DBMS which can be used by staff members at the site only through a number of
tamper-free terminals These tamper-free terminals represents the only valid access
points to the database. A number of tamper-free terminals are also provided at the
site for use by individuals in the public, while remote tamper-free terminals may
also be connected, provided a secure channel can be created between the remote
tamper-free terminals to the local tamper-free terminals. When an individual wishes
10

to submit data to an institution or to verify existing data held by an institution, he
or she must interact via a tamper-free terminal which establishes a connection with
another tamper-free terminal located at the institution. Communications between
these two terminals must be via a session key which is selected by either terminal
and is transferred securely to the other. The session key is then discarded by both
terminals after the session is over.
The security of the scheme relies on the tamper-resistance of the chips and the randomness of the one-way hash function. To reduce the risk of abusing stolen chips,
authentication of a chip's owner should be conducted by such means as user password [3]. In current stage the scheme does not pretend to cover all possible points of
attack, and clearly it does not provide a balanced burden of trust between an individual and an institution. Afterall, it is the institution that maintains the database
containing the individual's private information. In practice it is difficult to prevent
an insitution from creating an informal and separate "black list" database containing
"off-the-record" information upon which in reality it bases it's decisions concerning a
given individual. Other security measures are also required to prevent staff members
of an institution from sharing data illegally with other institutions (eg. manually
copying onto a removable hard disk). The scheme in this paper represents a first step
towards providing a practical mechanism in the face of an emerging new technology.
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